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that the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the blood test does
violate our state constitution. In spite of the Attorney General's state-
ment, there is reason to assume that the present Texas law will be
challenged. Taking into consideration the fact that Texas is among the
leading states with regard to the death toll on its highways, due in
large measure to drunken driving, perhaps the Trammel decision
should be overruled.
Pamela T. Maxham
Construction of Texas Insurance Contract
Erie Misapplied
Loy Thomas Brown was killed when the private airplane that he
was piloting crashed. Brown was insured by policies issued by Paul
Revere Life Insurance Company. The policies contained exclusionary
clauses excepting liability for "death or disability resulting from
flight in aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane."' Paul
Revere denied liability under the policies, contending that Brown, as
pilot of the plane, was clearly excluded. The First National Bank in
Dallas, administrator of Brown's estate, brought a diversity suit in
the United States district court and obtained a summary judgment,
the district judge being of the opinion that Texas law was settled in
favor of recovery. Paul Revere appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, but that court abstained from deciding this and two
companion cases.' In its abstention opinion the court stated, "The
guidance of the dim light of the Texas decisions leaves the meaning
of the questioned clauses obscure. Without further enlightenment any
judgment we might pronounce would be a 'forecast rather than a
determination.' "' The court suggested that the parties seek declaratory
judgments in the Texas courts. The Texas Supreme Court refused
jurisdiction for declaratory judgment in United Services Life Ins. Co.
v. Delaney, companion case to Paul Revere, on the ground that any
ruling would be an advisory opinion.4 As a result, the Fifth Circuit
'Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 359 F.2d 641, 642 (5th Cir. 1966).
2United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 935 (1964); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Price, 329 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964).
The United Services and Paul Revere cases were decided together. Both of these cases, as well
as the St. Paul Mercury case, involved the construction of exclusionary clauses in Texas in-
surance contracts and the applicability of Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren, 152 Tex. 164, 254
S.W.2d 762 (1953).
a United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, supra note 2, at 484, quoting in part Railroad
Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
'United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965). In Delaney
the Texas Supreme Court said:
If the state court is to entertain a suit for declaratory relief, it must have the
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was forced to rule upon the merits. Held, reversed and remanded:
The term "passenger" as used in exclusionary clauses of insurance pol-
icies excepting liability for death or disability resulting from 1 flight
in aircraft except as a passenger, is not ambiguous and does not in-
clude the pilot. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 359
F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1966).
According to the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins,' stringent restric-
tions are placed upon the federal judiciary in diversity cases. Federal
courts may not determine questions of state law independently or
subjectively but must follow state court decisions, even though they
are in conflict with the weight of authority on the point in question
and though they are contrary to the views of the federal court.'
Where there is no direct expression of what the state law is on a given
point, the federal court must look to indirect indications of how the
state courts will ultimately decide the question." The Fifth Circuit it-
self has stated:
[T]he obligation to accept local interpretations extends not merely to
definitive decisions, but to considered dicta as well .... Indeed, under
the implication of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, '. . .
it is the duty of the federal court, in dealing with matters of either
power and jurisdiction to settle the controversy by entry of a final judgment.
This is not a case in which a federal suit has been stayed in order that some
other and different lawsuit pending in the state courts may be determined.
Here, in effect, the same suit is pending in both the state and federal courts
by reason of a directive which contemplates that the final judgment will be
rendered by a federal court. The Circuit Court's reservation of jurisdiction
to render final judgment renders these proceedings advisory in nature ...
[T]he rendition of advisory opinions by courts is unauthorized by our consti-
tution....
Following the Delaney decision, proceedings in Texas courts toward declaratory relief in the
Paul Revere and St. Paul Mercury cases were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
For a discussion of the application of the abstention doctrine by the Fifth Circuit and
the subsequent refusal of the Texas courts to assume jurisdiction for declaratory relief in
Delaney, see Note, Refusal of State Court To Assume Jurisdiction After Federal Abstention,
20 Sw. L.J. 402 (1966).
SErie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Johnson v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 212 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Krauss v. Greenburg, 137 F.2d 569 (3d Cir 1943).
'The Fifth Circuit has in the past been one of the foremost proponents of the principle
that under the Erie doctrine federal courts must have regard for any persuasive data avail-
able, including dicta, when there is no direct expression of state law. New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Schlatter, 203 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1953), citing Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d
488 (8th Cir. 1941); Polk County, Ga. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1959). In Polk County, Ga. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., supra at 490-91, the court,
in reference to its decision in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Schlatter, stated:
[T]his court justified following a state court pronouncement which was as-
serted to be a dictum by this quotation from the Supreme Court. 'At least it is
a considered dictum, and not merely obiter. It has capacity, though less than
a decision, to tilt the balanced mind toward submission and agreement. ...
In controversies so purely local, little gain is to be derived from drawing nice
distinctions between dicta and decisions. Disagreement with either, even though
permissible, is at best a last resort, to be embraced with caution and reluc-
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common law or statute, to have regard for any persuasive data that is
available, such as compelling inferences or logical implications from
other related adjudications and considered pronouncements. The re-
sponsibility of the federal courts, in matters of local law, is not to for-
mulate the legal mind of the state, but merely to ascertain and apply
it. Any convincing manifestation of local law, having a clear root in
judicial conscience and responsibility, whether resting in direct expres-
sion or obvious implication and inference, should accordingly be given
heed.'
Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren9 is the only Texas case on the
question posed by Paul Revere-whether a pilot of an airplane is cov-
ered by an insurance contract which excepts death resulting from
flight in aircraft except as a passenger on a civilian plane. The insur-
ance contract involved in Warren was an accident policy issued to
the firm employing Warren as a pilot. The policy covered injury to
employees, officers, or guests of the policyholder, "provided such
injury is sustained by the insured person in consequence of riding as
a passenger in, boarding, alighting from, making a parachute jump
from (for the purpose of saving his life) or being struck by"'" the
named aircraft. Warren was killed while piloting the airplane. Con-
tinental Casualty denied liability for Warren's death on the ground
that since Warren was piloting the plane when killed, he could not
qualify as a person riding as a passenger in the aircraft. The Texas
Supreme Court held that Warren, though the pilot of the plane, was
within the coverage of the Continental Casualty policy. In arriving
at its determination, the court stated, "the mere word 'passenger'
cannot be said to exclude the pilot"'" and "common parlance
undoubtedly uses it (the word 'passenger') at times in the sense of
occupant. . . ,"" The court followed the established Texas rule that
where wording in an insurance contract is susceptible to more than
one interpretation the construction favoring the insured should be
adopted. 3 The court noted that "the insurer may not escape liability
merely because his or its interpretation should appear to us a more
tance. The stranger from afar, unacquainted with the local ways, permits
himself to be guided by the best evidence available, the directions and counsel
of those who dwell upon the spot.'
See also West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Cold Metal Process Co.
v. McLouth Steel Corp., 126 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1942); Mattson v. Central Elec. & Gas
Co., 174 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1949).
BPolk County, Ga. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1959),
quoting Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1941).
9152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762 (1953).
'0254 S.W.2d at 763.
n Id. at 764.
12 Ibid.
13 See note 15 inf ra.
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likely reflection of the intention of the parties than that urged by the
insured. The latter has to be no more than one which is not itself
unreasonable.""
Warren v. Continental Cas. Co. has bearing on Paul Revere, not
only because it follows the rules of construction of insurance policies
in favor of the insured," but also because it seems to establish that
under Texas law the word "passenger" is ambiguous and is a proper
subject for construction. In Paul Revere, the Fifth Circuit directed its
major efforts, not at determining what Texas law is, but at distinguish-
ing the facts of the Warren case from those of Paul Revere. Reason-
ing that Warren did not directly hold that a pilot is a passenger and
that the Warren court considered other policy language relevant,"
14254 S.W.2d at 763.
15 It is a settled principle of insurance law that ambiguities in insurance contracts are to
be strictly construed against the insurer. Trahan v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 155 Tex. 548,
289 S.W.2d 753 (1956); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239
S.W.2d 379 (1951); Davis v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 142 Tex. 29, 175 S.W.2d 957 (1943); McCaleb
v. Cont. Cas. Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W.2d 679 (1938); Roth v. Traveler's Protective
Ass'n, 102 Tex. 241, 115 S.W. 31 (1909); Goddard v. East Tex. Fire Ins. Co., 67 Tex. 69,
1 S.W. 906 (1886); Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 32 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930) error ref.; Home Ben. Ass'n v. Brown, 16 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
error ref.; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 260 S.W. 223 (Tex. Civ. App .1924)
error ref.; Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 226 S.W. 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
error disra.
In Kelly v. American Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), aff'd, 325
S.W.2d 370 (1959), the court said:
[I]t is necessary to apply certain elementary rules of construction (all rooted in
the same basic concept) including these: (1) an insurance policy will be con-
strued strictly against the insurer; (2) when the terms of an insurance con-
tract are capable of two or more constructions and under one a recovery is
allowable and under the other it is denied, the construction which permits re-
covery will be given the policy; (3) forfeitures of insurance coverage is not
favored; and (4) if a fair and reasonable construction of an insurance con-
tract will permit, a meaning will be given to its language that effectuates a
contract of insurance rather than defeats it.
For examples of the application of these rules of construction, see Standard Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co. v. Hardee, 330 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e., where
the word "within," as used in an accident policy providing coverage for loss due to injuries
sustained while riding "within" a vehicle was held not to exclude recovery for a person
injured while standing on a truck bed; United Am. Ins. Co. v. Gravett, 339 S.W.2d 682
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e., where a policy excluding "dental treatment" was
held not to exclude an operation on the neck of the insured necessitated by the extraction
of wisdom teeth; American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fox, 184 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. w.o.m., where sunstroke suffered by insured was held to be within the protection
of an accident policy insuring against bodily injury sustained through external, violent, and
accidental means; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hanna, 195 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e., where death of insured by toxic agranulocytosis, or absence of
white blood cells due to drug sensitivity, brought about by taking drugs in accordance with
a doctor's orders, was held to be "death by accidental means."
","It must be conceded that the full phrase 'riding as a passenger in,' does suggest a
meaning of 'passenger' as a non-operative of the plane. However, we obviously are not limited
to considering this one phrase, if other provisions of the policy have logical bearing on the
intended coverage, as they do." 254 S.W.2d at 765.
Though only liability under the "riding" risk was in dispute in Continental Cas. Co. v.
Warren the Warren court considered the complete enumeration of the risks in the policy-
"riding as a passenger in, boarding, alighting from, making a parachute jump fromi ... or
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the Fifth Circuit concluded that the word "passenger" was not found
to be ambiguous by the Texas court but that the policy as a whole
was considered ambiguous. Since no other policy language was rele-
vant in Paul Revere-the case turned solely upon the construction of
"passenger"-the Fifth Circuit felt that it was free from the re-
straints of Texas law to make an independent decision. Therefore, it
concluded, "the term 'passenger' is not inherently ambiguous when
used in its common or popular meaning.""
The Fifth Circuit seems to have reversed its self-established ap-
proach to Erie questions in areas where state law is unclear. In the
past the court has proceeded toward decisions from cases which,
though not directly in point, it found to "afford a lantern as we
make our Erie way."'" Through this method, in Ford Motor Co. v.
Mathis" and in Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 2 the court utilized
distinguishable yet parallel Texas cases as a starting point in deter-
mining that Texas would now accept strict liability for manufacturers
of eminently dangerous defective non-food products, though Texas
courts had previously extended strict liability only to manufacturers
of food products."' In Ford Motor Co. and Putman the Fifth Circuit
found related Texas cases and, using those decisions as vehicles, fol-
lowed them to logical conclusions in determining the point in con-
troversy, keeping in mind its responsibility to decide the matters as a
state court would.
In Paul Revere the court seems to view the most nearly related
case, Continental Cas. Co., as an obstacle to be avoided instead of as a
starting point to utilize in proceeding toward a proper Erie conclu-
sion. Statements made in Continental Cas. Co., which concededly may
be dicta, are in direct conflict with the Paul Revere holding that
being struck by" the plane, to determine the effects of the construction urged by the insurer
on the policy. The court found that "grammatically speaking, any requirement of the insured
person being a passenger in the sense of non-operator applies only to the 'riding' risk and to
none of the other four." The court felt that it was not likely that the parties intended the
pilot to be covered by the policy while "boarding, alighting from, making a parachute jump
from . . . or being struck by" the plane, yet to be excluded while riding in it. Thus,
"passenger" was construed to mean occupant and the pilot was held covered under the
"riding" risk.
It should be noted that elsewhere in the Warren opinion the court had stated that "the
mere word passenger cannot exclude the pilot" and "common parlance undoubtedly uses it
in the sense of occupant." These statements seem to be to the effect that "passenger" standing
alone is ambiguous.
1"359 F.2d at 644.
18Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963), Note, 18 Sw. L.J. 128
(1964).
" Ibid.
20 3 3 8 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964). See Recent Decision, 19 Sw. L.J. 198 (1965).
2" For a complete analysis of the problem of applying strict tort liability to manufac-
turers, see Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
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"passenger" is not ambiguous. 2  Speculation as to whether these
statements constitute a direct holding by the Texas Supreme Court
that "passenger" is ambiguous or whether the statements are dicta
is unimportant. The court is duty-bound to follow the statements if
they constitute a direct holding or to consider them indicative of
what Texas law is or ultimately will be if the statements are dicta.
The Paul Revere decision cites no Texas cases in support of its hold-
ing that "passenger" excludes "pilot" but instead cites one United
States Supreme Court case giving a definition of "passenger" as used
in connection with travel on a train. Aside from the fact that a
Supreme Court holding is of doubtful import in an attempt at a
determination of Texas law, ' the Fifth Circuit brings itself into direct
conflict with Continental Cas. Co. once again by choosing to cite the
carrier definition of "passenger." In Continental Cas. Co. the Texas
Supreme Court stated, "the significance of 'passenger' as applied to
common carriers has little relevance to a situation where no carriage
for hire, public or private is involved."' Since no carriage for hire
was involved in Paul Revere, it is evident that this statement from
Warren is an applicable indication by the Texas court of Texas law.
The fact that the Fifth Circuit chose to use as authority a United
States Supreme Court case giving a definition clearly inapplicable
under Texas law is evidence that the court was proceeding toward an
independent pronouncement."
As pointed out by Judge Gewin in his dissent, the propriety of the
Fifth Circuit's action in overruling the decision of the district judge
is questionable. The Fifth Circuit abstained from deciding Paul Re-
vere originally because the "dim light of the Texas decisions leaves
the questioned clauses obscure." '7 Judge Gewin argues that in a situ-
ation where state law is unclear the local federal judge should not be
lightly overruled. Judge Gewin cites two United States Supreme
Court cases in which that court decided to defer to the decisions of
the federal district judges because existing state law was unclear. In
MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co." the Supreme Court said,
"No decision of the [state supreme court], or any other court of that
State construing the relevant [state] law has been brought to our
22 See text accompanying notes 11 and 12, supra.
23359 F.2d at 644, citing Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U.S.
80 (1934).24
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.309(2) (2d ed. 1965).
25254 S.W.2d at 764.
' It is interesting to note that seventy pages are devoted to defining the term "pas-
senger" in different situations and jurisdictions. 31A WORDS & PHRASES 15 (perm. ed.).
27United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (Yth Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 935 (1964).
2'315 U.S. 280 (1942).
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